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California Employment Law Update

Tuesday, November 15, 2011
IRS Holds out the Carrot and California Holds the Stick
By Gerald A. Griffin, Esq. and Gary E. Scalabrini, Esq.

The Carrot

Recently the IRS rolled out a new, voluntary worker classification settlement program. Employers will have an opportunity to reclassify their independent contractors as employees and escape a good share of tax liability and penalties that would otherwise attach to such a reclassification.

To be eligible:

  • an applicant must have consistently treated the workers in the past as nonemployees;
  • must have filed all required Forms 1099 for the workers for the previous three years;
  • must not currently be under audit by the IRS; and
  • must not currently be under audit by the Department of Labor or a state agency concerning the classification of these workers.

 

Employers accepted into the program will pay an amount effectively equaling just over one percent of the wages paid to the reclassified workers for the past year. No other interest or penalties will be due, and the employers will not be audited on payroll taxes related to these workers for prior years. Participating employers should note, however, that for the first three years under the program, they will be subject to a special six-year statute of limitations, rather than the usual three years that generally applies to payroll taxes.

The Stick

SB 459: California Imposes New Penalties for Employee (Independent Contractor) Misclassification.

Effective January 1, 2012, this new law imposes greater civil penalties for employers who willfully misclassify their workers as independent contractors. Penalties include civil penalties ranging from $5,000 to $25,000 per violation, which could be assessed by the Labor Commissioner or, presumably, under the California Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”).

Other remedies include a “Scarlet Letter provision,” requiring an employer to display on its website, or other area accessible to employees and the general public a notice that explains that the employer has been found guilty of committing a serious violation of the law by willfully misclassifying employees, along with other required information. The law also prohibits charging misclassified independent contractors fees or deductions from compensation (such as rental fees for space or equipment), if those fees and deductions would not permissible to charge an employee.


Quick Tips on How to Avoid the Stick and Get the Carrot

1) Employers should consider a timely and thorough self-audit of such classifications.

2) Identify when an independent contractor morphs into an employee or if the employer at some point overreaches and exerts a new, higher level of control over the work at issue. The employee versus independent contractor determination turns on control—how much control does the employer exercise over how the worker accomplishes his or her task?

3) Turn to the statutes for guidance: California and federal statutes, case law and regulations provide some guidance regarding such “control” and overlap in many respects. In particular, the IRS administrative guidelines, although not dispositive, provides some fairly straightforward “employee versus independent contractor” concepts.

4) In performing a self-audit of worker classifications, it is critical to obtain assistance from labor and employment counsel, human resources experts, or both.

IRS News Release Link

 

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The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP ("GGLTS") for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel. For specific questions about any of the content discussed herein or any of the content posted to this website please contact the article attorney author or send an email to info@gglts.com. The transmission of information on this, the GGLTS website, or any transmission or exchange of information over the Internet, or by any of the included links is not intended to create and does not constitute an attorney-client relationship. For a complete description of the terms of use of this website please see the Legal Notices section below. This publication may not be reproduced or used in whole or in part without written consent of the firm.


California Employment Case Law Update

Monday, August 15, 2011

Unclean Hands Provide a Defense for a California Employer

By Monte K. Grix,Esq.

 

 

In Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co, _____Cal.App.4th ___ (3d Appellate District, 2010) an employee sued a former employer for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act and wrongful failure to hire in violation of public policy. 

 

This case arises from a seasonal employee’s failure to be rehired after suffering a workplace injury during prior term of employment.  On a motion for summary judgment, the employer presented undisputed evidence that the Social Security number used by the employee belonged to another person living in North Carolina.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on the basis of the after Acquired Evidence doctrine and the doctrine of “Unclean Hands.”  The Court of Appeal affirmed.

 

The Doctrine of Unclean Hands:

 

It is against public policy to provide equitable relief to a person who has engaged in misconduct. 

 

Federal Law:

 

Applicants for employment are required to make certain representations, pre-employment, that establish that they are legally authorized to work in the United States.  Among other things, applicants must fill out a federal “I-9” form and submit certain documents, such as a California Driver License and a Social Security card, that evidence such employment authorization. 

 

The I-9 form requires, among other things, the applicant to sign a statement, under penalty of perjury, that the documents are genuine and the information presented is correct.  The employer must likewise sign off on the apparent authenticity of the documents presented for inspection.  

 

In this case, based on such federal legal requirements, the employer submitted materially undisputed evidence that, as a matter of company policy and compliance with federal law, it would not hire anyone not legally authorized to work in the United States.  The employer accordingly established that, had they known that the plaintiff was ineligible to work in the United States, they would not have hired him or offered him employment.  The California Court of Appeal concluded that the employee had no actionable claim for wrongful refusal to hire or disability discrimination because he had no right or ability to work for defendant or any other United States employer.

 

California Employer Defense Insight:

 

 

1)      Employers need to use their best, good faith efforts to comply with the United States immigration and work authorization laws.  Such efforts include close compliance with the requirements set forth on the federal I-9 form, and may include the use of E-Verify to establish employment eligibility. 

 

2)      If an employee or applicant later asserts an employment discrimination or wrongful termination claim and that employee in fact lacked authorization to work in the United States at the time of his or her hire, the employer may be able to use both the After Acquired Evidence and Unclean Hands doctrines as a defense if the employer can demonstrate that it has an established company policy of refusing to hire or to continue to employ ineligible workers. 


 

Questions or Comments? Contact Us at:
Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet, LLP
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The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP ("GGLTS") for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel. For specific questions about any of the content discussed herein or any of the content posted to this website please contact the article attorney author or send an email to info@gglts.com. The transmission of information on this, the GGLTS website, or any transmission or exchange of information over the Internet, or by any of the included links is not intended to create and does not constitute an attorney-client relationship. For a complete description of the terms of use of this website please see the Legal Notices section below.


This publication may not be reproduced or used in whole or in part without written consent of the firm.


California Prevailing Wage Update

Thursday, July 28, 2011
By Gary E. Scalabrini, Esq. and Monte K. Grix, Esq.

California Court of Appeals Reaches an Important Decision Regarding Prevailing Wages

In Hensel Phelps Construction Company v. San Diego Unified Port District (2011) ___ Cal.App.4th __, 2011 WL 3058889, the California Court of Appeal reached an important decision regarding application of California’s Prevailing Wage Law (“PWL”) to a privately developed hotel project constructed on land leased from a public entity where the lease provided a rent credit of up to $45.6 million during the first eleven years of the lease. The Court of Appeal held that the project was a public work requiring the payment of prevailing wages because (1) it constitutes construction done under contract for the purposes of the PWL and (2) the construction was “paid for in whole or in part out of public funds” due to the rent credit in the lease.

Under the PWL, a “public work” is defined as any construction, alteration, demolition, installation or repair work done under contract and paid in whole or part out of public funds. Section 1720(b)(4) specifically provides that the phrase “paid for in whole or part out of public funds” includes fees, costs, rents, loans or other obligations that would normally be required under the contract, that are paid, reduced, waived or otherwise charged at less than fair market value by the public entity.

In Hensel Phelps Construction, the San Diego Unified Port District (the “Port”) entered into a ground lease of property with One Park Boulevard LLC (“OPB”) for the exclusive purpose of an “upscale major convention-center-oriented headquarters hotel.” The lease provided a “rent credit,” which was to be applied until the credit equaled $46.5 million or December 31, 2016, whichever occurred first. OPB subsequently contracted with Phelps Portman San Diego LLC (“Phelps Portman”) to serve as the developer, who in turn contracted with Hensel Phelps Construction Company (“Hensel Phelps”) as the construction manager.

Upon a request submitted to the Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) by two labor affiliated groups, the DIR determined that the project at issue was paid for in whole or in part out of public funds and was subject to prevailing wages. Hensel Phelps and Phelps Portman (the Petitioners”) filed a petition with the superior court for a writ of mandate directing the DIR to rescind and vacate the determination, which the court granted. The superior court held that the
rent was not “reduced, waived or forgiven” because there was no baseline established in the record by which to measure the rent. The court further determined that an appraisal obtained by Hensel Phelps and the fact that the lease was reached after arm-lengths negotiations between sophisticated parties established that the rent was not charged at less than fair market value.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the superior court. In its decision, the appellate court addressed two principal arguments raised by the Petitioners. First, the Petitioners argued that the project was not “construction . . . under contract” pursuant to the PWL because, among other things, OPB only entered into a ground lease with the Port. OPB thereafter entered into its own contract with the Phelps Portman, who in turn, entered a construction contract with the Hensel Phelps. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the lease constituted a contract for construction for the purpose of the PWL because: (i) the lease required construction of a hotel; (ii) the lease required that OPB spend at least $220 million on the project; and (iii) failure to comply with any contractual provision concerning the construction project would constitute a breach of the lease.

The Petitioners’ second argument was that under section 1720(b)(4), rents are “reduced,” and the project is a public work, only if there is a preexisting contract to pay rent, which is later reduced. Here, Petitioners argued that the rent credit at issue fell outside the scope of Section 1720(b)(4) because the credit and the agreement to pay rent occurred in the same agreement, i.e., there was no preexisting agreement to pay rent which was later reduced. Petitioners also argued that such a “reduction” should come within the statute only if the rent was reduced below fair market value.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument as cumbersome and contrary to common sense and the plain meaning of the statute. The Court noted that to accept Petitioners’ argument would essentially adopt the logic of a prior appellate court decision, which was abrogated by the Legislature in adopting, among other provisions, the statutory language set forth in section 1720(b)(4). The appellate court also rejected the contention that in order to show a rent reduction, it must also be shown that the rent is below market value. In particular, court held that “a public agency may pay for construction out of public funds either by reducing rent or by charging rent at less than fair market value. There is no requirement that both conditions be present.”

Construction Industry Insight

Any developer or contractor considering construction work on a project pursuant to an agreement with a public entity, including a lease agreement or purchase agreement, whose object is construction of a project that is financed in any way with public funds, should be extremely careful in structuring, reviewing, bidding or executing the work on the agreement. Moreover, public entities must take care in drafting agreements with developers to ensure the public entity does not incur liability if prevailing wages are not paid on such projects. In order to ensure compliance with the PWL and for clear contractual allocation of liability for compliance, the public entity, developer or contractor should seek the advice of a labor law attorney.

Link to Hansel Phelps Construction Company v. San Diego Unified Port District Published Opinion

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:
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The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP ("GGLTS") for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel. For specific questions about any of the content discussed herein or any of the content posted to this website please contact the article attorney author or send an email to info@gglts.com. The transmission of information on this, the GGLTS website, or any transmission or exchange of information over the Internet, or by any of the included links is not intended to create and does not constitute an attorney-client relationship. For a complete description of the terms of use of this website please see the Legal Notices section below.

This publication may not be reproduced or used in whole or in part without written consent of the firm.

Employment Law Update: CA Supreme Court Ruling on Overtime Laws

Tuesday, July 05, 2011

Q:  As to CA based employers, do California’s overtime laws apply to employees who are residents of other states, but who work part time here? 

 

A: YES (from California Supreme Court).

NEW CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT RULING ON OVERTIME LAWS

By Monte K. Grix, Esq.


Case Summary:

 

In Sullivan v. Oracle Corporation, a class of former Oracle employees, residents of Colorado and Arizona, worked as instructors for that company, specifically, instructing Oracle clients at their places of business in the use of Oracle products.  In the course of such work these employees sometimes travelled to and worked in other states, including California.  These employees sued Oracle in a class action in the United States District Court, Central District of California, alleging that they were covered by California’s more generous overtime laws for the time they worked in California.  The District Court granted a motion for summary judgment in Oracle’s favor, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and then withdrew its decision, instead certifying certain questions to the California Supreme Court.  In what might be considered an understatement, the Ninth Circuit remarked that the issues presented had “considerable practical importance” and could have “an appreciable economic impact on the overall labor market in California.” 

 

To the point, the California Supreme Court was asked to address this central question: do California’s overtime laws apply to residents of other states for the days and weeks such employees worked in California.  By unanimous decision, the Supreme Court answered “yes.” 

 

Dispensing with Oracle’s arguments that application of California’s overtime laws was overreaching and infringed upon the sovereignty of the states where plaintiffs’ resided, the California Supreme Court stated, “That California would choose to regulate all nonexempt overtime work within its borders without regard to the employee’s residence is neither improper nor capricious.”  Among other things, the Court noted that California, like all states, has the constitutional “police power” to regulate employment matters.  With regard to a potential conflict of laws, the Court engaged in a comprehensive analysis and concluded that there was no actual conflict to resolve where California law, as to California-based employers, was applied to provide the employees at issue even greater protections than they would otherwise receive under the laws of their home states and under the Fair Labor and Standards Act.

 

The California Supreme Court then attempted to paint the limits of its decision by musing that “California law might not apply to nonresident employees of out-of-state businesses who enter California temporarily during the course of the workday,” and noting that the claims at issue in the present case concerned only entire days and weeks.  The Court also cautioned against extrapolating the logic of this decision to other aspects of California employment law such as mandatory meal and rest breaks: “one cannot necessarily assume the same result would obtain for any other aspect of wage law.” 

 

Insight:

 

It is clear that the Court’s decision represents a sizeable shift, which, unlike the promulgation of a revised statute, affects not only employer payroll issues and liability issues prospectively, but also, in some sense, retroactively:  companies with non-resident, non-exempt employees who have worked any number of days within the applicable statute of limitations (generally 3 years under the California Labor Code) could see a rise in wage and hour actions seeking unpaid overtime wages.  Although every employer’s situation is different and must be considered on the relevant facts, we recommend that you contact GGLTS to arrange for a consultation.  Under such circumstances, it may be wise to be proactive: to conduct an internal audit of the payroll records of the affected employees—including an analysis of whether potentially affected employees are properly classified as exempt or non-exempt—and to take appropriate action based upon the audit results.

 

Questions or Comments? Contact Us at:
Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet, LLP
1880 Century Park East, Suite 1200
E-mail: info@gglts.com or call (310) 552-3400

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The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP ("GGLTS") for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel. For specific questions about any of the content discussed herein or any of the content posted to this website please contact the article attorney author or send an email to info@gglts.com. The transmission of information on this, the GGLTS website, or any transmission or exchange of information over the Internet, or by any of the included links is not intended to create and does not constitute an attorney-client relationship. For a complete description of the terms of use of this website please see the Legal Notices section below.

This publication may not be reproduced or used in whole or in part without written consent of the firm.

Copyright 2011 Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP



U.S. Supreme Court Curtails Employee Class Action Lawsuits

Wednesday, June 22, 2011
United States Supreme Court Decision Summary: Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
by Monte K. Grix, Esq.

The United States Supreme Court issued a decision this week, Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, that dramatically alters the landscape of class actions in Federal District Court based upon employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and, in all likelihood, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls certification for class actions. Among other things, it requires that the class present “common issues of law and fact.” In Walmart, the plaintiffs in the class action purported to sue for millions of gender discrimination claims at the same time. The Supreme Court opined that “commonality” requires that the class representative demonstrate that all class members “suffered the same injury,” not merely that that they all suffered a violation of the same provision of law. In this case, the plaintiffs did not allege that Walmart had any express corporate policy against the advancement of women. Rather, plaintiffs purported linchpin as to commonality was the fact that Walmart granted discretion to local managers in hiring and promotion decisions, and that these managers exercised this discretion to unlawfully discriminate against female Walmart employees. The Supreme Court held that this alleged fact actually demonstrated a lack of commonality, as the “crux of the inquiry” as to a Title VII discrimination claim is the “reason for a particular employment decision.” Because the answer to this inquiry would require an individualized inquiry as to each local supervisor (if not each employment decision), the Court opined, such disputes lacked the commonality necessary to proceed as a class action.

Because of common origin and legislative purposes, case decisions regarding Title VII are routinely applied by courts faced with FEHA cases. Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that the Walmart case will have profound effects on class litigation of employment discrimination claims in federal court, whether such claims arise under FEHA or under Title VII.

Link to supreme court opinion:

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf



Questions or Comments? Contact Us at:
Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet, LLP
1880 Century Park East, Suite 1200
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The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP ("GGLTS") for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel. For specific questions about any of the content discussed herein or any of the content posted to this website please contact the article attorney author or send an email to info@gglts.com. The transmission of information on this, the GGLTS website, or any transmission or exchange of information over the Internet, or by any of the included links is not intended to create and does not constitute an attorney-client relationship. For a complete description of the terms of use of this website please see the Legal Notices section below.

This publication may not be reproduced or used in whole or in part without written consent of the firm.

Copyright 2011 Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP

California Employment Law Update: Employee Private E-Mail

Tuesday, April 19, 2011
“PRIVATE” E-MAILS SENT FROM EMPLOYEE’S WORK ACCOUNT?
THINK AGAIN


By Monte K. Grix, Esq.


In all walks of life, the explosion of information technology over the last 20 years has had profound effects on our society that we are constantly struggling to get our arms around. In the workplace, among other things, this proliferation has meant that e-mails have largely displaced hard copy letters and interoffice memoranda. To grapple with the issues electronic communications present, prudent employers have developed clear and concise electronic communications and internet use policies that state that the use of the employer’s computers and the transmission of e-mails is restricted to the furtherance of the employer’s business, and that any personal e-mails sent to or received by any employee on his or her assigned work computer are accordingly the property of the employer and are not private. Although such policies reflect common sense and seem to be aligned with privacy laws generally, until recently, their effectiveness and validity seemed to be an open question. A January 2011 decision by the California Court of Appeal indicates that such employer policies are on solid footing.

The Facts: In Holmes v. Petrovich Development Company, LLC, the plaintiff-employee was offended by her supervisor’s comments regarding her pregnancy. After a testy exchange between the supervisor and the employee regarding the potential length of the employee’s pregnancy leave, the employee proceeded to exchange e-mails with a labor and employment attorney through her work e-mail account.

The employee ultimately resigned and sued her employer for, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. In support of its motion for summary judgment on the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the employer submitted the e-mails that the employee had sent to her attorney. The employee moved for discovery sanctions on the basis that the e-mails were attorney-client privileged communications and that their use and disclosure was an abuse of the discovery process under the California Civil Discovery Act.

The employee’s sanctions motion was denied, these same e-mails were admitted at trial, and ultimately the employer prevailed on all remaining causes of action after a jury trial. The employee appealed on the basis that the e-mails were attorney-client privileged and that it was error for the trial court to deny sanctions and to admit these e-mails into evidence. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that confidential communications do not lose their confidential character merely because they are in electronic form, but held that this wasn’t the point—the e-mails at issue were not private and not confidential because the employee acknowledged receipt of a company policy that expressly stated this fact. The employer’s handbook actually described such a company e-mail as a “postcard” rather than a sealed letter. To drive the point home, the Court of Appeal stated that, had the employee e-mailed her counsel from her home computer, that communication would surely have been privileged; however, the employee instead “used defendants’ computer, after being expressly advised this was a means that was not private and was accessible by [the supervisor]. This is akin to consulting her attorney in one of defendants’ conference rooms, in a loud voice, with the door open, yet unreasonably expecting that the conversation overheard by [her supervisor] would be privileged.” See Holmes v. Petrovich Development Company, LLC, 2011 WL 117230 at 14.

The Bottom Line: The Holmes decision clearly supports employer policies restricting employees’ use of employer computers and electronic communications and disclaiming any right of privacy to such communications. Critical to the Court’s analysis, however, was the fact that the employer expressly and clearly communicated a cogent, written policy regarding computer and internet use to its employees. In the absence of such a buttoned down policy, the decision could have gone the other way.

The Plan of Action: An out of date employee handbook is akin to out-of-date virus software: not very effective. Contact GGLTS for review of your employee handbook. Your company’s electronic communications and internet use policy is only one of several such policies that may benefit from a timely review and revision.

The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP ("GGLTS") for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel. For specific questions about any of the content discussed herein or any of the content posted to this website please contact the article attorney author or send an email to info@gglts.com. The transmission of information on this, the GGLTS website, or any transmission or exchange of information over the Internet, or by any of the included links is not intended to create and does not constitute an attorney-client relationship. For a complete description of the terms of use of this website please see the Legal Notices section below.

This publication may not be reproduced or used in whole or in part without written consent of the firm.

Copyright 2011 Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP

California Employment Law Update Presentation

Thursday, September 30, 2010
Download the complete presentation. DOWNLOAD HERE

The content contained herein is published online by Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP ("GGLTS") for informational purposes only, may not reflect the most current legal developments, verdicts or settlements, and does not constitute legal advice. Do not act on the information contained herein without seeking the advice of licensed counsel. For specific questions about any of the content discussed herein or any of the content posted to this website please contact the article attorney author or send an email to info@gglts.com. The transmission of information on this, the GGLTS website, or any transmission or exchange of information over the Internet, or by any of the included links is not intended to create and does not constitute an attorney-client relationship. For a complete description of the terms of use of this website please see the Legal Notices section below.

This publication may not be reproduced or used in whole or in part without written consent of the firm.

Copyright 2011 Gibbs, Giden, Locher, Turner & Senet LLP